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Freedom of Speech: The Florida
Implications of PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins
STEVEN D. PIDGEON*
The expansion of individual liberties by courts interpret-
ing state constitutions more broadly than the Federal Constitu-
tion has been a significant trend in recent years. In the area of
free speech, the Supreme Court of California recently held that
the California Constitution protects speech-related activities in
shopping malls, subject to reasonable regulation. The United
States Supreme Court found adequate state grounds to uphold
that decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, al-
though the Federal Constitution does not extend so far. The
author examines the series of cases culminating in PruneYard
and discusses its relevance to Florida law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shopping malls' have increasingly formed the backdrop for lit-
igation over the competing interests of private property ownership
and the guarantees of free speech and religion.' According to tradi-
tional notions of state action, the first amendment constrains gov-
ernmental rather than private abridgment of these guarantees.8
Mall owners have argued, then, that they have a right to prohibit
or restrict the exercise of free speech and religion in and about the
premises of malls." After a great deal of confusion had arisen in
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1981; former member, University of Miami
Law Review; Associate, Streich, Long, Weeks & Cardon, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. For an extensive description of a modern shopping mall, see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 553-55 (1972).
2. The Court has held freedom of speech to include such activities as picketing, Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940), handbilling, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960),
and distributing religious materials, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Although the Supreme Court has not considered religious freedom in the context of
malls, one may analogize from the free speech cases discussed throughout this article. The
International Society for Krishna Consciousness has been active in litigation in a number of
related contexts. For a summary of the major Krishna cases, see Edwards v. Maryland State
Fair and Agric. Soc'y, 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1979).
3. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973).
4. E.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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this area,5 the Supreme Court in Hudgens v. NLRB6 squarely up-
held this argument.'
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of California held that
the California Constitution protects "speech and petitioning, rea-
sonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are
privately owned."' The Supreme Court of the United States in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins9 affirmed this decision,
holding that a state could adopt constitutional provisions more
protective of individual liberties than the Federal Constitution.10
This comment will discuss the decisions leading up to and in-
cluding Hudgens," as well. as the recent PruneYard decision. 2 It
will conclude with a discussion of the probable effect of these cases
on Florida law." Specifically examined is whether Florida will (or
should) adopt the approach of the Supreme Court of California
and read the free speech and religion clauses of the Florida Consti-
tution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the Federal Constitution.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
The precursor to the "mall cases"' 5 was Marsh v. Alabama.'6
In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness was arrested on trespass charges for
distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-
owned town. Because the town possessed "all the characteristics of
any other American town,"' 7 the Court held that it could not deny
5. In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Supreme Court commented: "[T]he
history of this litigation has been a history of shifting positions on the part of the litigants,
the Board, and the Court of Appeals. It has been a history, in short, of considerable confu-
sion, engendered at least in part by decisions of this Court." Id. at 512.
6. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
7. Id. at 520-21.
8. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
9. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
10. Id. at 2040. For complete discussion of the PruneYard decision, see notes 53-71 and
accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 15-52 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 53-71 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 72-142 and accompanying text infra.
14. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (freedom of speech); id. § 3 (freedom of religion); see notes
74-82 and accompanying text infra.
15. The term "mall cases" refers generally to the major cases involving shopping cen-
ters and malls discussed throughout this article.
16. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
17. Id. at 502. This "public function" doctrine is one test under the "state action" doc-
trine. "Under the public function doctrine, the state may regulate the use of private prop-
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to individuals the first amendment freedoms that inhere in public
property. 18 Relying on those cases holding that publicly owned
streets, sidewalks, and parks historically have been so closely asso-
ciated with the exercise of first amendment rights that access to
them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot be denied,' 9
the Court reversed the conviction. Importantly, Justice Black, who
authored the opinion, noted that as between the rights of property
owners and the rights of "people to enjoy freedom of press and
religion, . . . the latter occupy a preferred position.' '2 0
The Court decided its first "mall case" on the authority of
Marsh. In Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 1 the owner of a mall sought an injunction to restrain a
union from picketing a nonunion supermarket located within the
mall. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the issuance of
an injunction by the Court of Common Pleas. The United States
Supreme Court framed the issue before it in this way: "[W]hether
peaceful picketing of a business enterprise located within a shop-
ping center can be enjoined on the ground that it constitutes an
unconsented invasion of the property rights of the owners of the
land on which the center is situated." 23 Finding that "[tihe shop-
ping center here [was] clearly the functional equivalent of the busi-
ness district . . . involved in Marsh,' 4 the Supreme Court re-
versed the issuance of the injunction, holding that
[b]ecause the shopping center serves as the community business
block "and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area
and those passing through," Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 508,
the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its
trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public
erty when the property is the type usually owned and operated by the government for the
benefit of the public." Note, Shopping Center Picketing: The Impact of Hudgens v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 812, 814 n.21 (1977). The Court also
implied the presence of state action in the town's use of state trespass laws to convict the
petitioner. 326 U.S. at 509. For a more complete discussion of the state action requirement,
see Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment Ad-
judication, 61 MINN. L. REv. 433 (1977); Note, Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center: Fed-
eralism and State Protection of Free Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 805 (1980).
18. The solicitation of donations and distribution of religious literature are first amend-
ment rights. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
19. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 442 (1938).
20. 326 U.S. at 509 (emphasis added).
21. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
22. 391 U.S. at 312-13.
23. Id. at 309.
24. Id. at 318.
1981]
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wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the prem-
ises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the
use to which the property is actually put.5
The Court added, however, that the mall owners were not "without
power to make reasonable regulations governing the exercise of
First Amendment rights on their property. ''2 The implication was
that, notwithstanding the protection afforded first amendment ac-
tivities relating to the mall's operation, mall owners could impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on them.7
Justice Black, the author of Marsh, dissented vigorously.'8
The Court, he argued, had gone too far. The Logan Valley case did
not implicate the "preferred position" he had alluded to in Marsh,
because the shopping center was not the functional equivalent of a
state-created municipality.
The question is, Under what circumstances can private property
be treated as though it were public? The answer that Marsh
gives is when that property has taken on all the attributes of a
town, i.e., "residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business
places are situated.""
Noting that property rights, as well as first amendment rights, are
of constitutional proportion,"0 Black concluded that the majority's
holding amounted to a taking of the mall owner's property without
due process of law.81
25. Id. at 319-20 (emphasis added). The Court specifically omitted the issue whether
the first amendment protected picketing unrelated to the use of the mall. Id. at 320 n.9.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), discussed at notes 32-40 and accompanying text
infra, answered this question in the negative.
26. 391 U.S. at 320.
27. Id. See generally Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941). The result reached by the Supreme Court in Logan Valley is almost
precisely that reached by the Supreme Court of California in Robins v. PruneYard Shop-
ping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), affd, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980); see notes 53-71 and accompanying text infra. The only distinction is that the former
interpreted the Federal Constitution, and the latter applied the California Constitution. Of
course, the Supreme Court of the United States subsequently retreated from its position in
Logan Valley in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and expressly overruled it in
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); see notes 41-52 and accompanying text infra.
28. 391 U.S. at 327-37.
29. Id. at 332 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 502).
30. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See also Henely, Property Rights and First Amend-
ment Rights: Balance and Conflict, 62 A.B.A.J. 77, 77 (1976).
31. 391 U.S. at 330. Justice Black argued that the Court, acting as an agent for the
government, had taken the mall owner's property and given it to the picketers for their use.
Id.
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Only four years after Logan Valley, the Supreme Court
handed down Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.3 2 The question considered in
Lloyd was whether a privately owned shopping center could pro-
hibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the
handbilling was unrelated to the shopping center's operations.38
This issue arose when a group of draft resisters sought declaratory
and injunctive relief after mall owners had threatened them with
arrest unless they stopped distributing handbills within the mall
complex. Since its inception, the mall owners had strictly enforced
a policy prohibiting all handbilling."
In reversing the lower court's grant of injunctive relief, the
Supreme Court distinguished both Marsh and Logan Valley, limit-
ing each to its facts. Marsh, unlike Lloyd, "involved the assump-
tion by a private enterprise of all of the attributes of a state-cre-
ated municipality."5 Logan Valley, according to the Court,
applied only in "a context where the First Amendment activity was
related to the shopping center's operations.""6 "The handbilling
.. .in the malls of Lloyd Center had no relation to any purpose
for which the center was built and being used. '37 Further, other
forums were available to the protestors." Thus, the Court held
that the lower court had improperly granted the injunction. 9
Although the Court in Lloyd purported to distinguish Logan
Valley,40 the Court announced in Hudgens v. NLRB 41 that Lloyd
had overruled Logan Valley by implication. Hudgens owned an
enclosed mall that contained sixty retail stores. He had leased one
32. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
33. Id. at 552.
34. The mall owner had selectively allowed certain charities to solicit donations within
the mall, although this point was not an issue on appeal. Id. at 555.
35. Id. at 569 (emphasis added). Here, the Court appeared to return to the analysis of
Justice Black in his opinion in Marsh and his dissent in Logan Valley. See notes 28-31 and
accompanying text supra. See also Comment, Lloyd v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Val-
ley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1973).
36. 407 U.S. at 562.
37. Id. at 564.
38. The Court distinguished Logan Valley on this ground as well, stating that the
"[ulnion pickets in that case would have been deprived of all reasonable opportunity to
convey their message to patrons of the ... store had they been denied access to the shop-
ping center." Id. at 566.
39. Id. at 570.
40. Some commentators and courts argued before Hudgens that Lloyd had, in fact,
overruled Logan Valley. E.g., Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 10 n.2 (Fla. 1976) (Hatchett, J.,
dissenting); Comment, supra note 35.
41. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
42. Id. at 518.
19811
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of them to a shoe company, which also owned a warehouse in an-
other part of town.43 As a result of a labor dispute, the warehouse
employees picketed the retail store located in the mall. After
Hudgens threatened them with arrest if they did not leave, the
picketers filed an unfair labor charge against him." Basing its deci-
sion on Logan Valley, the NLRB issued a cease-and-desist order
against Hudgens." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
constitutional law or federal labor law, or both, governed the right
of picketers to picket on private property."
After reviewing Marsh, Logan Valley, and Lloyd, the Supreme
Court concluded that the union did not have a first amendment
right to picket at the mall,'47 and remanded to the NLRB for deter-
mination of the rights and liabilities of the parties under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 4" Relying heavily on the doctrine that
the first amendment restricts only governmental bodies, and not
private property owners,'0 the Court found that these privileges
did not apply in the context of a mall since it does not possess "all
of the attributes of a state-created municipality. 5 0 The Court con-
cluded "that the rationale of Logan Valley [had] not survive[d]
the Court's decision in the Lloyd case."51
43. The shoe company owned nine retail stores in the area, all of which the warehouse
employees picketed. Id. at 509.
44. The picketers filed the charge under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), which provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
45. The Board issued the cease-and-desist order under section 8(a) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 157 of this title ... "
46. 424 U.S. at 510-12.
47. Id. at 520-21.
48. Id. at 523.
49. Id. at 513.
50. Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. at 569). Note that the Court
once again returned to the analysis of Mr. Justice Black. See notes 28-31 and accompanying
text supra. For a list of "the attributes of a state-created municipality," see Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 502, 503 (1946).
51. 424 U.S. at 518. Justice Marshall, the author of the Logan Valley opinion, dissented
vehemently, arguing that the holding of Logan Valley, which governed picketing related to
use of the mall, remained viable after Lloyd, which supposedly struck down picketing unre-
[Vol. 35:559
FREE SPEECH AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
With the Hudgens opinion, the Court had come full circle
since its decision in Logan Valley. In doing so, the Court clearly
defined the right of private property ownership vis-A-vis the first
amendment guarantees in the context of malls: Since malls are not
public property, nor do they possess all the attributes of a state-
created municipality, mall owners may prohibit or restrict the ex-
ercise of first amendment rights within the boundaries of mall
property.
With federal law clearly established, the Court had set the
stage for PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.52
III. PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER V. ROBINS
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 8 the Supreme
Court faced the issues of
whether state constitutional provisions, which permit individu-
als to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of
a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited,
violate the shopping center owner's property rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or his free speech rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
The appellees in Prune Yard were high school students who
were soliciting support for their opposition to a United Nations
resolution against "Zionism." They set up a booth in the courtyard
of a shopping center, distributed pamphlets, and asked passers-by
to sign various petitions."5 Informed that their activities violated
the shopping center's regulations, 6 the students complied with a
request to leave, but later filed suit for injunctive relief.57 The Su-
preme Court of California reversed the lower court's denial of re-
lief, holding that the California Constitution protects "speech and
petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the centers are privately owned."50
lated to the mall's use. Id. at 535-36. Additionally, he pointed out that the majority had
departed "from traditional modes of adjudication" by bypassing the statutory question and
"reaching out to overrule a constitutionally based decision." Id. at 526.
52. 100 S. Ct. 2035.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2038 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. The shopping center had a policy of not permitting "any visitor or tenant to engage
in any publicly expressive activity. . . not directly related to [the center's] commercial pur-
poses." Id.
57. Id.
58. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153
1981]
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The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.59 The
Court rejected the mall owner's reliance on Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner,60 distinguishing it as a case decided under the Federal Consti-
tution. Lloyd's reasoning, then, did not "ex proprio vigore limit
the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sover-
eign right to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.
61
The Court added: "It is, of course, well-established that a State in
the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions
on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a
taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal
constitutional provision."62
The mall owner then contended that the right to exclude
others underlies the fifth amendment guarantee against the taking
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979).
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of California expressly overruled Diamond
v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974) (hereinafter referred to as
Diamond IH) (overruling Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501
(1970) (hereinafter referred to as Diamond )). On the authority of Logan Valley, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Diamond I had held that a mall owner's general prohibition
against nonbusiness activity could not prohibit peaceful and orderly first amendment activi-
ties. 3 Cal. 3d at 665-66, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509. In Diamond II, the California
Supreme Court reversed its position on the basis of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972). Significantly, the Diamond II court overlooked the liberty of speech provision of the
California Constitution, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2. A footnote suggested that federal and state
supremacy clauses barred such an inquiry and that Lloyd was controlling in all respects. 11
Cal. 3d at 335 n.4, 521 P.2d at 463 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
In Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979), the Supreme Court of California concluded that Lloyd did not bar its holding
that the California Constitution creates broader speech rights in relation to private property
than does the Federal Constitution. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. Ac-
cording to the court, Lloyd "merely defined federal free speech rights," id., at 904, 592 P.2d
at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (emphasis added). This presumably frees the Supreme Court of
California to balance independently speech and property rights created by the California
Constitution. Additionally, the court pointed out that California long had subjected private
property to overriding public interests. In this connection, the freedoms of speech and relig-
ion occupied a "preferred position" in California law, even in the context of private prop-
erty. Id. at 905-06, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
For an additional discussion of this line of California cases, see 2 WHirTER L. REV. 423
(1980).
59. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
60. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
61. 100 S. Ct. at 2040; cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (state constitu-
tions may impose higher standards than Federal Constitution in search and seizure area if
they choose to do so).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2040-41 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (zoning regulations were valid exercise of police power because of public interest in
segregating incompatible land uses)).
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of property without just compensation." Although the Court
agreed that "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property
rights is the right to exclude others,""' it pointed out that not
every injury to property by the government is a taking in the con-
stitutional sense.66 Since the record failed to reveal that the peti-
tioners' activity "unreasonably impair[ed] the value or use of [the]
property as a shopping center,'" no taking had occurred. The
Court also noted that the Supreme Court of California had ex-
pressly approved the use of reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions, 7 which could minimize interference with commercial
activity.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the owner had a
first amendment right not to be forced by the state to use his prop-
erty as a forum for the speech of others." The owner had, by
choice, made the shopping center available to the public. It was
open to members of the public to come and go as they pleased,
and, from a practical standpoint, there was little danger that the
people exercising their right to free speech would be identified
with the owner. Additionally, he could expressly disavow any con-
nection with them simply by posting signs.69
63. 100 S. Ct. at 2041.
64. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
65. 100 S. Ct. at 2041 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)); see
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1922).
66. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
67. Id. For a discussion of time, place, and manner restrictions, see In re Hoffman, 67
Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
69. Id. The Court distinguished the three cases relied on by the mall owner, Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), and West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Wooley, the Court
held that the State of New Hampshire could not require that license plates on noncommer-
cial motor vehicles bear the motto "Live Free or Die." Since California did not compel the
mall owner to display any specific message on his private property, the Court found Wooley
distinguishable. 100 S. Ct. at 2044.
Tornillo struck down a Florida statute that required a newspaper to publish a political
candidate's reply to criticism previously published in that newspaper. The Court found that
the statute contravened the principle that a state cannot dictate what a newspaper may
print, and intruded too heavily on the function of editors. 418 U.S. at 256-57. The 'Court
found no such intrusion in PruneYard. The decision of the Supreme Court of California
intruded upon neither the mall owners' property nor their first amendment rights. 100 S. Ct.
at 2044.
In Barnette, the Court struck down a resolution of the West Virginia State Board of
Education requiring all children to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag. The
Court in PruneYard found Barnette inapposite. Barnette, according to the Court,
involved the compelled recitation of a message containing an affirmation of be-
lief because it "require[d] the individual to communicate by word and sign his
19811
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PruneYard adds a new dimension to the tension between pri-
vate property ownership and the freedoms of speech. According to
the decision, each state may interpret its constitutional provisions
consistently with or more broadly than corresponding federal pro-
visions. Thus, a state may elevate its freedom of speech to a "pre-
ferred position" even when in conflict with rights of private prop-
erty, subject only to due process limitations.7 0 To date, Florida has
not done so. The next section considers whether the courts of Flor-
ida will (or should) adopt this position.7 1
III. FLORIDA LAW
A. Textual Argument
The texts of both the Florida and Federal Constitutions pro-
vide the starting point for determining whether Florida will afford
greater protection than the federal government for the free exer-
cise of speech. Although evidence of language broader than that of
the first amendment would not be conclusive on the Florida
courts,72 such language should be persuasive.
The Federal Constitution's freedom of speech clause states
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech .... ,,78 Florida's constitution provides, in part: "Every
person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects
but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press. '7 4
acceptance" of government dictated political ideas, whether or not he subscribed
to them. 319 U.S. at 633, 63 S. Ct. at 1183. Appellants [mall owners] are not
similarly being compelled to affirm their belief in any governmentally prescribed
position or view, and they are free to publicly dissociate themselves from the
views of the speakers or handbillers.
100 S. Ct. at 2044 (first brackets added by the Court in PruneYard; second brackets added
by the author).
70. By permitting mall owners to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions, the Supreme Court of California recognized that too great an intrusion on the prop-
erty rights of the owners would constitute a "taking" without due process of law. The Su-
preme Court of the United States relied on this limitation in upholding the California
court's decision. 100 S. Ct. at 2042.
71. See notes 72-142 and accompanying text infra.
72. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (197.7); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bill Of Rights,
8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
74. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4. The remainder of section 4 provides: "In all criminal prose-
cutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter
charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party shall be ac-
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Two distinctions are readily apparent from a comparison of
these two provisions. First, the Federal Constitution constrains leg-
islative action only.78 On the other hand, the Florida provision pro-
hibits all laws abrogating the free exercise of speech, including,
presumably, judicially created ones.7  Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, Florida's constitution protects against restraint or abridg-
ment; the Federal Constitution protects against abridgment only.
Abridgment suggests contraction or condensation and contem-
plates a reduction in the scope of the right affected." Restraint
has broader meaning. In addition to incorporating the definition of
abridgment, restraint comprises acts that hinder or obstruct the
full enjoyment of the right granted.7  To constitute restraint, an
act need not reduce the scope of the right, but may only make it
more difficult to enjoy.
For example, suppose a state passed a law subjecting politi-
cians to the payment of a one-hundred dollar fee each time they
made a speech. Although one could argue that such a fee
"abridged" their right to freedom of speech, an easier argument to
make would condemn the fee as a restraint. That is, although the
fee would not prevent politicians from making campaign speeches,
it certainly would inhibit or "restrain" them from doing so.79 In
this sense, then, the Florida provision regarding speech appears
more expansive than the first amendment.
Significantly, California's free speech provision is nearly iden-
tical to Florida's. In relevant portion, it declares: "Every person
may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not re-
strain or abridge the liberty of speech or press."80 The only major
quitted or exonerated." Id.
75. Note that the first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
76. Although the phrase "no law shall be passed" seems to preclude legislative actions
only, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (1970), de-
clared that "it is undisputed that the command that no law shall be passed also means that
no order shall be issued and no regulation adopted in the name of the state which infringes
on the liberty herein reserved to the people." Id. at 127. In that case, the plaintiffs con-
tended that a court injunction restrained their constitutional right of free speech. The court
stated that, in a proper case, it would strike down an injunction that restrained speech. Id.
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 9 (5th ed. 1979).
78. Id. at 1181.
79. Cf. State ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff, 153 Fla. 84, 13 So. 2d 704 (1943) (licensing
charge may not be a prerequisite to sale or distribution of religious literature). But see
Sadowsi v. Shevin, 351 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
80. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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difference is the addition of the word "freely." Although this addi-
tion superficially seems to indicate that the citizens of California
enjoy greater protection of speech, press, and religion than do the
citizens of Florida, it is important to note that Californians, like
Floridians, are "responsible for abuse of [these] right[s]."'81 Thus,
even though the rights granted under the California Constitution
may be "freely" exercised, they are subject to the same limita-
tion-abuse-as are the rights granted under the Florida Constitu-
tion. This qualification undercuts the significance of the addition
of the word "freely," which on analysis seems to add little to the
otherwise identical language of the Florida Constitution. In this
connection, because the provisions of both constitutions are lin-
guistically similar and grant rights of nearly identical scope, it is
reasonable to assume that the Florida courts will look long and
hard at the Prune Yard decision in determining the extent of Flor-
ida's protection of free speech.8'
81. Id.
82. In Project Report, supra note 72, at 317-18, the authors state:
Because courts are naturally reluctant to venture into uncharted territory, it
is obviously desirable to adduce decisions from other states that have already
done what the litigant is asking ....
If the litigant can show that the bill of rights provisions of the two states
share a common origin or some other telling characteristic, the stature of the
sister state precedent will be increased substantially.
Also ioteworthy are the distinctions between the freedom of religion clauses in the
Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution. The latter provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend I, cl. 1. Again, the clause restrains Congress, not all law-
making bodies. Florida's constitution, in comparison, prohibits all laws, without regard to
their source: "There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting
or penalizing the free exercise thereof." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. The remainder of this section
provides:
Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals,
peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid
of any church, sect or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian
institution.
Id.
Secondly, Florida's provision constrains not only laws that "prohibit" the free exercise
of religion, but those that merely "penalize" it. Thus, a law that does not actually prohibit
religious activity but imposes substantial burdens thereon might violate the Florida Consti-
tution, though permissible under federal standards. For example, suppose that Florida
passed a statute requiring every religious organization that received contributions from citi-
zens or residents of Florida to disclose the amount of each contribution so received, the
name and address of the corresponding contributor, the reason for the contribution, and so
on. Surely this law would not prohibit a religious organization from soliciting or receiving
contributions. See generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The time and
expense of acquiring the information and generating the necessary paperwork, however,
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B. Florida Case Law
No Florida case has held that Florida's constitution provides
greater free speech protection than the Constitution of the United
States, either in the context of shopping malls or otherwise. In
fact, few cases have dealt with the tension between this guarantee
and the rights attending ownership of private property.83 The dis-
cussion that follows 84 examines those and certain related cases to
determine which rights the Florida courts have favored in the past
and will probably favor in the future.
One of the first cases in Florida considering the delicate bal-
would unquestionably work a severe hardship on the religious organizations subject to the
statute. That is, it would "penalize" them for carrying on necessary activities, the solicita-
tion and acceptance of contributions. Since one could make a strong argument that such a
statute would run afoul of the Florida Constitution, but not of the Federal Constitution, the
Florida Constitution apparently offers greater protection for religious freedom than does the
Federal Constitution.
Although the Florida Constitution limits religious freedom to practices not inconsistent
with public morals, peace, or safety, FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3, the United States Supreme
Court also has placed this limitation on the Federal Constitution. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
The California Constitution's freedom of religion clause provides:
Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference
are granted. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.
A person is not incompetent to be a witness or juror because of his or her
opinions on religious beliefs.
83. But a number of cases have considered the extent to which the state may limit the
privileges of free speech and religion. E.g., State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973)
(freedom of speech); cf State ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff, 153 Fla. 84, 13 So. 2d 704 (1943)
(freedom of religion).
In Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1979), the Supreme Court of Florida considered
the limitations that a state could place on first amendment rights in the context of public
property. In that case an organization known as Women Acting Together to Combat Harass-
ment (WATCH) conducted a "consumer inspection" of a hospital's maternity facilities. The
inspection took place after visiting hours had ended for the day. Two days after the inspec-
tion, the members of WATCH were arrested under a Florida trespass statute for willfully
entering "a structure or conveyance . . . without being authorized, licensed, or invited." Id.
at 843; see FLA. STAT. § 810.08(1) (1979).
After the trespass convictions, WATCH appealed. The group argued, inter alia, that
the hospital was a public facility that "impliedly invited" members of the public to enter it.
The court agreed, but noted that "as the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), this public access may be expressly limited to the
extent necessary for the orderly functioning of a private facility." 375 So. 2d at 844. As for
WATCH's argument that its members could ignore the hospital's visiting hour prohibitions
with impunity, the court stated: "The fact that one is exercising first amendment rights
while violating otherwise proper restrictions upon their entry to a public facility does not
insulate them from prosecution for trespass." Id.
84. See notes 85-114 and accompanying text infra.
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ance between these competing interests was NAACP v. Webb's
City, Inc.85 In that case, a business sought an injunction against
the NAACP to prevent further interference with its business. The
NAACP was picketing the business in an attempt to induce a con-
sumer boycott. The chancellor, "mindful of the various rights and
freedoms comprehended, expressly or impliedly, within the protec-
tive provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions,"86 issued a
permanent injunction to enjoin the picketing. He noted that the
picketing had caused a "tense and inflammatory situation,"87 ad-
versely affecting not only the plaintiff's business, but the entire
community. Striking down the NAACP's contention that they had
an unconditional right to picket, the chancellor ruled that the de-
fendants' actions were "unlawful and . . . not clothed with consti-
tutional protection." 88
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed, hold-
ing that the commercial expectancies of the business, itself a prop-
erty right, outweighed the picketers' social objectives.
When considering the plaintiff's interest in its commercial
expectancies from its business weighed against the defendants'
interest in advancing their social objectives and the injury occa-
sioned by the defendants' coercive picketing causing plaintiff's
customers and prospective customers not to enter into or con-
tinue business relations with the plaintiff, it appears that the
Chancellor has not erred.8'
The court relied heavily on the notion that "[o]ne's business.., is
in every sense of the word property, and, as such, [is] entitled to
protection from all unlawful interference. 90
The court, in Webb's City, emphasized protecting the business
owner's property rights. One could interpret this as a signal that
Florida courts will be reluctant to construe the free speech protec-
tions of the Florida Constitution more broadly than those of the
Federal Constitution. More likely, future courts will limit Webb's
City to its particular facts. Although Webb's City involved a shop-
ping center, the picketing was far from peaceful and, in fact, dis-
85. 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), vacated as moot, 376 U.S. 190 (1964).
86. Id. at 181.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 182 .
89. Id. at 183.
90. Id. at 182. See generally Schwartz, A Landholder's Right to Possession of Property
Versus a Citizen's Right of Free Speech: Tort Law as a Resource for Conflict Resolution, 45
U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1976).
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rupted the entire community.91 This situation differs greatly from
the facts in Prune Yard or in the cases decided under the Federal
Constitution.9 2 Thus, it is doubtful that Florida courts will con-
sider this case as controlling when they confront the precise issue
presented to the California Supreme Court in Robins v. PruneYard
Shopping Center."5
The only other significant "mall case" of Florida is Corn v.
State.9 4 The defendant in Corn, while patronizing a store in the
mall, started an argument with the store's salesperson. A security
guard instructed the defendant to leave and informed him that if
he returned he would be prosecuted for trespassing. The defendant
left but subsequently returned, at which time he was arrested.
Eventually he was convicted of trespass.95 The defendant appealed
his conviction on the ground that the trespass statute9 denied
equal protection. He offered no argument that the conviction vio-
lated his free speech rights under either the federal or the state
constitution.9
The Supreme Court of Florida, in addition to holding that the
trespass statute did not deny equal protection to the defendant,98
offered broad dicta, much of which centered on the "inalienable
right" that all persons have "to acquire, possess, and protect their
property."99 With reference to malls, the court stated:
The lobby of a commercial mall is a privately owned building to
which the public has been invited to come, to look and to buy.
The invitation presupposes that the conduct of persons coming
there will be in keeping with such purposes. However, reasona-
ble nondiscriminatory restrictions pertaining to the use of the
Mall may be placed on the users of such Mall, such as the re-
quirement that shoes be worn. [Like] any invitation, it can be
91. The Supreme Court of California in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 23 Cal.
3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980), stated: "It
bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy
rights of an individual homeowner or proprietor of a modest retail establishment." Id. at
910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (quoting Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d at 345,
521 P.2d at 470, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 478) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
92. See notes 15-51 and accompanying text supra.
93. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
94. 332 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1976).
95. Id. at 5-6.
96. FLA. STAT. § 821.01 (repealed 1974).
97. 332 So. 2d at 6, 8.
98. Id. at 9. The court remanded the case on a technicality for the entering of a proper
judgment.
99. Id. at 7.
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limited and, upon abuse, be withdrawn or revoked."'
Paradoxically, Corn v. State seems to support two conflicting
positions. Its broad language describing the unfettered rights at-
tending private property ownership suggests that those rights oc-
cupy a "preferred position" in Florida's constitutional scheme. Yet
by noting that mall owners may adopt reasonable regulations relat-
ing to the internal activities of a mall, the court implied that cer-
tain activities must be permitted. Unfortunately, the court failed
to detail these activities.The reason for this failure is obvious. Corn was not a freedom
of speech case. The court carefully emphasized this point numer-
ous times in its opinion.101 Thus, the precedential value of the
dicta in Corn for cases on freedom of speech is questionable, seem-
ing to support two competing positions at best. Like Webb's City,
Corn will not bar the Florida courts from holding that freedom of
speech occupies a "preferred position" vis-A-vis the private prop-
erty rights of a mall owner.
In a recent opinion,102 the Attorney General shed some light
on the state of the law in Florida on first amendment rights. He
analyzed the issue whether a county fair could refuse to rent a
booth to the International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON). 105 The fair had a general policy prohibiting all solicita-
tion and feared that ISKCON would rent the booth for just that
purpose.10 4 ISKCON argued that such a refusal would violate its
rights to free speech and religion as guaranteed by the federal and
the Florida constitutions. 10 5
The Attorney General agreed with this contention, finding
100. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Recall that the Supreme Court of California in the
PruneYard case also provided that a mall owner could adopt reasonable regulations. 23 Cal.
3d at 909-10, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
101. 332 So. 2d at 6, 8.
102. [1977] FLA. ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 51.
103. Actually, the Attorney General faced three related questions:
1. May the [fair association] refuse to rent a booth at the fair to [ISKCON], a
religious society, on the grounds that said society intends to solicit funds on the
fair premises?
2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, may the association evict
[ISKCON] members if the society should breach an agreement not to solicit
funds?
3. May the [fair association] deny ISKCON the right to solicit funds on the
grounds that the association has a general policy which prohibits all solicitation?
Id. at 51.
104. Id.
105. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4.
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"state action" because the fair was to be held on the Volusia
County Fairgounds, which were "within the class of public facili-
ties that have been determined to be appropriate forums for the
exercise of First Amendment rights."'' 6 He concluded that the first
amendment prohibitions against governmental intrusion on these
liberties applied. Basing his decision almost wholly on federal case
law, the Attorney General held that, subject to reasonable regula-
tion,10 7 ISKCON had a right to "distribute literature to, and solicit
contributions from, the public and generally propagate their reli-
gious beliefs on and in the public areas of the Volusia County
Fair," although the fair had adopted "a general policy against all
types of solicitation.' '08
Like Webb's City and Corn v. State, this opinion will have
little, if any, precedential effect on the issues presented in a case
similar to PruneYard. Because the Attorney General based his
opinion on "state action," he did not address the rights of property
ownership in relation to the rights of freedoms of speech and relig-
ion. 09 Resort by the Attorney General to federal law further
reduces the probable effect of the opinion on Florida law. In this
connection, though the Attorney General mentioned the federal
and the Florida constitutions simultaneously," 0 he failed to differ-
entiate between the two.
More recently, the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
had an opportunity to differentiate between these two constitu-
tional provisions but refrained from doing so, preferring to await
guidance from the Supreme Court of Florida. In Florida Canners
Association v. State,"' the court reviewed the association's chal-
106. [1977] FIA. ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. at 52. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant operated by private association under lease in building
financed by public funds and owned by state agency); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392
F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (bus terminal operated by port authority,
a public corporation).
107. The Attorney General emphasized that "the rights protected by the First Amend-
ment are not absolute, and the activities of ISKCON may be regulated to the extent neces-
sary to protect legitimate state interests." [1977] FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 53.
108. Id.
109. Although a lease entitles the lessee to exclusive possession of the premises, the
public ownership makes the government, as lessor, the ultimate intruder on first amend-
ment rights; the lessee is merely its agent. Thus "state action" takes private property rights
out of the Attorney General's analysis.
110. The opinion stated that the answers to the issues presented depended "upon the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment,
and applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and §§ 3 and 4, Art. I., State
Constitution." [1977] FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. at 52.
111. 371 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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lenge of a rule promulgated by the Department of Citrus; the rule
required the declaration of state of origin on grapefruit products
packed in retail containers in the state. Before declaring the rule
valid under the guarantee of free speech in both the Florida Con-
stitution and the Federal Constitution, " 2 the court declared:
We have first considered whether the guarantee contained in the
Florida constitution is any broader than that contained in the
United States Constitution. We have found no case in Florida
answering that question. We agree with the observation that
Florida courts tend to merge the two limitations to the point
that federal and state cases are cited interchangeably. Under the
circumstances, and in the absence of any expression by our su-
preme court that the Florida guarantee is broader in scope than
the federal, we conclude that the two are the same and will not
treat them separately.118
This brief look at Florida case law indicates that, should the
Supreme Court of Florida be faced with a case like PruneYard, it
will have no controlling precedent to prevent it from reading the
Florida Constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitution.
No Florida case has directly confronted the issues presented by
PruneYard. Although some decisions addressing related issues
contain broad dicta that arguably place private property rights in a
preferred position vis-A-vis the rights of free speech and religion,
one may readily distinguish these cases from Prune Yard (and the
cases preceding it, which were based on the Federal Constitution).
Thus, they do not present the supreme court with authority by
which it would be bound. Ultimately, resort to the case law of
other jurisdictions may be beneficial. 1 4 The next section will ex-
amine that possibility, to show where courts of other states are
heading in this area of the law and to suggest the probable course
that the Supreme Court of Florida will take.
C. Recent Trends
Of late .... more and more state courts are construing state
constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as
guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than
the federal provisions, even those identically phrased. This
is surely an important and highly significant development for
our constitutional jurisprudence and for our concept of
112. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4.
113. 371 So. 2d at 517.
114. See Project Report, supra note 72, at 317-18.
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federalism."'
In recent years, commentators, practitioners, and judges '16
have called upon state courts to construe their respective constitu-
tional guarantees more broadly. Despite some reluctance, 11" the
courts are following that suggestion with increasing frequency. 118
The plea arose, in large part, out of fear that the Burger Court
would dismantle "[t]he edifice that the Warren Court had con-
structed in the name of the Federal Bill of Rights."119 Noting that
decisions rendered on independent state grounds would not be re-
viewable by the Burger Court except in limited circumstances,1 0
commentators argued that a state court should use the tactic of
basing its decisions on a broad construction of its state constitu-
tion, as an independent state ground. 2 ' Of course, complete abro-
gation of Warren Court doctrine by the Burger Court never mate-
rialized. 22  Nonetheless, state courts have reawakened to the
possibility of relying on the "adequate state grounds" doctrine to
confer greater freedoms on their citizens. Although much of its use
has occurred in the area of criminal procedure,123 the courts also
have examined the guarantees of freedom of speech and religion.124
In expanding the protection of freedom of speech, California
remains the leading state. In Wilson v. Superior Court of Los An-
geles County,2 5 the Supreme Court of California laid the ground-
work for its decision in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center,26
stating: "A protective provision more definitive and inclusive than
115. Brennan, supra note 72, at 495.
116. Id; Mosk, The New States' Rights, 10 CALIF. L. ENFORCEMENT 81 (1976); Paulsen,
State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAN. L. REv. 620
(1951); Project Report, supra note 72.
117. "State court decisions and state constitutional materials are too frequently ignored
by both commentator and counsel ... " Paulsen, supra note 116, at 620. See also Project
Report, supra note 72.
118. See notes 125-34 and accompanying text infra.
119. Project Report, supra note 72, at 271. See also Howard, The Courts and Constitu-
tional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
120. Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61
CAL. L. REv. 273, 275 (1973).
121. Id. at 286; see Project Report, supra note 72. See generally Wilkes, The New Fed-
eralism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421,
437-51 (1974).
122. Project Report, supra note 72, at 271. But see Howard, supra note 119, at 874.
123. Howard, supra note 119, at 891-907; Wilkes, supra note 121.
124. See notes 125-33 and accompanying text infra.
125. 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
126. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980).
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the First Amendment is contained in our state constitutional guar-
antee of the right of free speech and press. "17
Soon thereafter, the Oregon Supreme Court echoed this lan-
guage. In Deras v. Myers,28 the court stated that its free speech
and press provision, which is like Florida's,12 "provide[d] a larger
measure of protection to the citizen[s] [of Oregon]"" than did the
Constitution of the United States. The court struck down two Ore-
gon statutes placing limits on funds that could be expended by or
on behalf of political candidates, although the Supreme Court of
the United States had upheld similar federal acts."3'
An early Virginia case, Robert v. City of Norfolk, also con-
cluded that its free speech and press provision offered broader pro-
tection than the first amendment. Significantly, Virginia's provi-
sion, like California's and Oregon's, is nearly identical to
Florida's.'
Thus, a trend in constitutional law has unquestionably
emerged. State courts, reawakened to the doctrine of adequate and
independent state grounds, have begun to construe their constitu-
tional guarantees so as to provide greater protection than that af-
forded by their federal counterparts. 3 Although only California
has expanded its free speech protection to shopping malls, it ap-
pears inevitable that other states will follow.
CONCLUSION
No definitive answer can be given to the question whether
Florida, like California, will hold that its constitution protects free-
dom of speech in privately owned malls. Nevertheless, a number of
factors favor the adoption of an analysis like that in Prune Yard.
127. 13 Cal. 3d at 658, 532 P.2d at 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
128. 272 Or. 47, 535 P.2d 541 (1975).
129. In relevant part, the Oregon Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed re-
straining the free expression of opinion, or the right to speak, write, or print freely on any
subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." OR.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Compare this provision with the Florida free speech provision, discussed
at notes 72-82 and accompanying text supra.
130. 272 Or. at 64, 535 P.2d at 549.
131. Id. at 67, 535 P.2d at 551.
132. 188 Va. 413, 49 S.E.2d 697 (1948) (solicitation of magazine subscriptions protected
by free speech clauses of both the Virginia Constitution and the United States
Constitution).
133. The Virginia free speech and press provision states that "any citizen may freely
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right." VA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Florida's free speech provision, discussed at notes 74-82
and accompanying text supra, is similar.
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First, the Florida Constitution's broad provisions on free speech
offer convincing textual support.' 8 ' Secondly, though certain Flor-
ida cases contain dicta suggesting that Florida case law strongly
protects the ownership of private property, these cases also recog-
nize that even private property is subject to some governmental
intrusion." 5 Finally, the trend of state law in general points toward
a broadening of state constitutional protection.'5 Generally, this
trend seems in the best interests of society.13
7
One should note that PruneYard was a carefully constructed,
narrow decision. The court considered the competing interests of
free speech and of private property ownership, recognizing consti-
tutional protection for each. The Supreme Court of California rec-
ognized that a complete denial of access to malls would unjustifi-
ably eliminate a valuable and increasingly important kind of
forum. 3 8 But to achieve a fair balance of speakers' rights and own-
ers' rights, the court provided that mall owners could impose rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the activities pro-
tected as free speech.' 3 ' Additionally, the court specifically limited
its holding to large, modern shopping complexes, expressly ruling
out residences and small retail establishments." 0
As in California, malls increasingly are becoming a way of life
134. This trend has not gone unnoticed in the area of freedom of religion. See Mazor,
Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 326; Paulsen, supra
note 116. Here, too, state courts are finding greater protection in their constitutions.-In City
of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Or. 508, 149 P.2d 972 (1944), for example, the Supreme Court
of Oregon, although noting that federal decisions construing the first amendment were per-
suasive as to Oregon's counterparts, stated that the Oregon freedom of religion provision
"conveyed . . . [a] more extended declaration of rights." Id. at 513, 149 P.2d at 974. Other
states, though not expressly holding that their freedom of religion clauses confer greater
protection than their first amendment counterpart, have not foreclosed such a holding. E.g.,
Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1970). In this
connection, at least one commentator has pointed out the great textual differences between
the freedom of religion clauses of many state constitutions and the corresponding clause in
the Federal Constitution. Paulsen, supra note 116, at 636.
135. See notes 72-82 and accompanying text supra.
136. E.g., City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941).
137. See notes 115-33 and accompanying text supra.
138. E.g., Brennan, supra note 72. But see Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 So. CALIF. L. REv. 750 (1972).
139. 23 Cal. 3d at 907, 910-11, 592 P.2d at 345, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858, 860.
Shopping malls are usually located in central areas serving vast numbers of people.
Since malls are natural meeting places, they have gradually extended their original commer-
cial purpose to become the modern "town square." The public uses malls in ways never
contemplated by their developers--for polling places, fashion shows, art exhibits, solicita-
tions, concerts, broadcasts, and community fund raising drives. Their value as a local forum
for the community is increasingly clear.
140. Id. at 909, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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in Florida.14 1 Prohibition from exercising even limited constitu-
tional freedom therein would substantially deny such freedom. The
courts can give effect to constitutional protection of the property
interests of mall owners by allowing them to impose reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on activities protected by the
freedom of speech. Florida has an abundance of law from which to
draw in this area.142 PruneYard has indicated that, at least in the
context of malls, courts can reasonably strike the delicate balance
between freedom of speech and private property ownership. This
writer urges that when the courts of Florida face this issue, they
adopt an analysis like that in Prune Yard.
141. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
142. See, e.g., State ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff, 153 Fla. 84, 13 So. 2d 704 (1943);
Hord v. City of Fort Myers, 153 Fla. 99, 13 So. 2d 809 (1943).
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